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Non-technical summary
A central bank can affect the private sector behavior by adjusting its instruments to changes in the current state of the economy, given that there exists some source of monetary non-neutrality, e.g., rigid prices. If it is able to credibly commit itself to future actions it can further alter expectations of a forward-looking private sector by policy announcement. Most real world central banks can however at best be characterized by a discretionary conduct of monetary policy. In order to stabilize prices and real activity, they can therefore not strategically manipulate expectations. Hence, they rely on vigorous state contingent adjustments of the prevailing policy instrument for macroeconomic stabilization.
In an environment where markets do not work frictionless and changes in nominal interest rates are associated with non-negligible costs, central banks should abstain from aggressive interest rate adjustments. Thus, there might exist a trade-off between the stabilization of prices and real activity, on the one hand, and of the nominal interest rate, on the other hand. This trade-off can lead to a less successful macroeconomic stabilization, especially, when a central bank acts in a discretionary way. This inefficiency is particularly harmful if such a policy is too accommodative to pin down expectations and the allocation. As a consequence, a discretionary monetary policy -though it is aimed to maximize social welfare -might allow for welfare-reducing macroeconomic fluctuations induced by selffulfilling expectations. Yet, even if fluctuations would not arise endogenously, the problem remains that monetary policy fails to select exactly one of multiple feasible equilibria.
It is shown in this paper that a central bank can -under the circumstances described above -implement different equilibria, which are consistent with a particular plan under discretionary optimization, by applying different operational procedures. We consider the cases where the central bank either sets the nominal interest rate in a forward-looking way or in an inertial way, or uses money injections. Since the central bank acts under discretion, it does not account for its impact on private sector expectations such that its plan does not exhibit any backward-looking element. However, monetary policy can be de facto history dependent if the central bank implements its plan by inertial interest rate adjustments or by money injections, i.e., by changes in the growth rate of the outstanding stock of money.
Due to a link to past conditions, monetary policy implementation can alter the way private sector expectations are built and can thereby affect macroeconomic fluctuations. As responses to aggregate shocks are smoothed out, a history dependent policy implementation can reduce welfare losses compared to an entirely forward-looking conduct of monetary policy. This welfare gain is found to increase with the severity of transactions frictions and with the persistence of aggregate shocks. Yet, the problem of equilibrium selection is not automatically resolved by a backward-looking policy implementation. Specifically, the central bank can only implement a history dependent equilibrium in a unique way if it uses money injections as its instrument. The predetermined stock of outstanding money is then relevant for central bank operations and for the allocation, and thereby serves as an equilibrium selection criterion. If, on the contrary, transactions frictions are negligibly small compared to distortions induced by price rigidities, the problem of equilibrium multiplicity vanishes and the interest rate should be applied as the monetary policy instrument.
On the one hand, this paper provides novel results regarding the problem of the monetary instrument choice based on welfare and determinacy properties under discretionary policy. On the other hand, it unveils a deficiency in many recent contributions to macroeconomic analysis of monetary policy. Studies on optimal monetary policy usually apply stylized models where the issue of policy implementation is not explicitly considered. While some real world central banks might be able to change interest rate targets by mere announcements, the majority of central banks still implements operating targets by quantity adjustments in open market operations. When monetary policy is solely characterized by state contingent adjustments of the nominal interest rate, the inefficiency of discretionary policy with regard to macroeconomic stabilization and the alleged problem of equilibrium multiplicity are likely to be over-emphasized. The analysis in this paper has shown that both problems are in fact less severe if the history dependence of monetary policy implementation, in particular, of money supply adjustments, is taken into account.
1 Introduction plement such a (not uniquely determined) plan of the central bank, can lead to unequal macroeconomic outcomes and therefore to different results regarding equilibrium determinacy and social welfare. Specifically, we consider three means of monetary policy implementation: i.) a forward-looking and ii.) an inertial reaction function for the risk-free nominal interest rate, as well as iii.) a forward-looking reaction function for monetary injections. If the plan is implemented by i.), the conduct of monetary policy by a central bank that acts in a discretionary way is entirely forward-looking. However, when the monetary instrument is set in a history dependent way, such as under an inertial interest rate reaction function, monetary policy becomes history dependent. The same result holds for the case iii.), where the central bank adjusts the money stock in a forward-looking way in order to implement its plan. The reason is that a central bank operation that is meant to adjust the supply of money has to take into account the (predetermined) stock of outstanding money. 5 Put differently, the beginning-of-period stock of money contains non-negligible information for a contingent money injection required to obtain a particular end-of-period stock of money. Thus, when money supply, i.e., the money growth rate, serves as the instrument monetary policy becomes history dependent, even if the central bank does -in contrast to ii.) -not consider past conditions as indicators for adjustments of its instruments.
We apply a standard New Keynesian framework with transactions frictions (modelled by money-in-the-utility-function) and with cost-push shocks. The central bank's plan under discretionary optimization is shown to allow for equilibrium multiplicity. Since interest rate changes are associated with non-negligible welfare costs, the central bank abstains from choosing a plan that is associated with strong (active) adjustments of the interest rate, which would lead to equilibrium uniqueness (since the Taylor-principle applies in our model). The likelihood of equilibrium multiplicity under discretionary policy thereby increases with the severity of transactions frictions. 6 However, the central bank can avoid equilibrium indeterminacy by designing a reaction function for the prevailing instrument in an appropriate way. For example, there exist interest rate reaction functions of type i.) that uniquely implement an entirely forward-looking solution to the central bank's plan. There further exists a money supply reaction function that uniquely implements a history dependent and stable solution to the plan. In contrast, it is shown that a reaction function of type ii.) cannot implement a history dependent solution of the plan in a stable and unique way. Thus, under an inertial interest rate reaction function the problem of equilibrium indeterminacy cannot be avoided, implying that monetary policy allows for non-fundamental equilibria and thus endogenous fluctuations.
Given that the reaction functions i.) − iii.) lead to different equilibria, which are all consistent with the central bank's plan, we compare the welfare implications of different means of monetary policy implementation. 7 As stressed by Woodford (2003a) , history dependence can be beneficial for social welfare when the private sector behavior is forwardlooking. Based on this principle, Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003b) have shown that social welfare can be raised under a discretionary monetary policy by introducing lagged endogenous variables in the central banker's objective, inducing the plan under discretionary optimization to be history dependent. Corresponding to these results, we find that equilibria under a history dependent implementation of monetary policy, i.e., under ii.) and iii.), can be associated with higher social welfare compared to the unique equilibrium under an entirely forward-looking interest rate setting, even if they are all consistent with the same plan. Social welfare is thus raised by a history dependent central bank behavior that is induced by monetary policy implementation, rather than by a particular plan based on preferences of a central banker which deviate from social welfare.
In general, history dependence affects the expectations about future realizations of macroeconomic aggregates and therefore their conditional variances. 8 Here, the relevance of a lagged variable for the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates under a reaction function ii.) or iii.) can lower welfare-reducing macroeconomic fluctuations, as forecast error variances tend to decrease with the introduction of relevant state variables. However, an extension of the state space increases the support of the stochastic variables, which might raise the variances of macroeconomic aggregates. We find that this effect on the variances of macroeconomic aggregates is less important when the autocorrelation of the common state variable, i.e., the cost-push shock, is high. The extent to which social welfare is raised under a history dependent implementation of the plan further depends on the particular economic structure. Specifically, we find that the welfare gain from a history dependent implementation increases with the severity of the distortion due to transactions frictions and with the degree of price flexibility. The main conclusion from the welfare analysis is therefore that a central bank should implement its plan by forward-looking interest rate adjustments only if the aggregate shock is not very persistent or transactions frictions are negligible. Otherwise, it should implement the plan in a history dependent way.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the analysis of discretionary monetary policy in two novel ways. Given an environment where monetary discretion allows for equilibrium multiplicity, we, firstly, show that a potentially welfare-enhancing history dependence can 7 We disregard the possibility that the central bank controls both instruments simultaneously, which is for example considered in Adao et al. (2003) . They demonstrate that the optimal allocation under sticky prices can welfare dominate the optimal allocation under flexible prices, if the central bank sets the nominal interest rate equal to a sufficiently small value and, simultaneously, controls money supply.
8 If a central bank takes into account the impact of monetary policy on expectations of a forwardlooking private sector, its plan would exhibit history dependence. See, for example, Woodford (2003a) for a so-called optimal commitment policy under a timeless perspective. be introduced by monetary policy implementation, in particular, by an inertial interest rate policy or a money growth policy. Secondly, the problem of equilibrium multiplicity under monetary discretion can be eliminated if the central bank implements its plan by state contingent money injections (but not by an inertial interest rate policy). 9 The remainder is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium behavior under different reaction functions. In section 4, we examine the central bank's plan under discretionary optimization and its implementation. In section 5, we compare social welfare under different solutions. Section 6 concludes.
The model
In this section we describe the macroeconomic framework, which closely relates to the model in Woodford (2003a) . There are three sectors, the household sector, the production sector, and the public sector. Cost-push shocks, which stem from exogenous changes in the elasticity of substitution of individual labor services, are the only source of uncertainty. There are no information asymmetries between the three sectors. Nominal (real) variables are denoted by upper-case (lower-case) letters.
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]. Households have identical asset endowments and identical preferences. Household j maximizes the expected sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous utilities U :
where E 0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility U is assumed to be increasing in consumption c and real balances M/P , decreasing in working time l, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. Instantaneous utility U is further assumed to be separable in the utility from private consumption and from real balances, and in the disutility of working time,
At the beginning of period t household j is endowed with holdings of money M jt−1 and a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment Z jt . Before the goods market opens, households enter the asset market, where they can adjust their portfolio and receive government transfers. Let q t,t+1 denote the period t price of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 normalized by the probability of occurrence of that state, conditional on the information available in period t. Then, the price of a random payoff Z jt+1 in period t + 1 is given by E t [q t,t+1 Z jt+1 ]. Households further receive wage payments and dividends D it from monopolistically competitive firms indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. The budget constraint of household j can be written as
where P t denotes the aggregate price level and w jt the (individual) real wage rate. Lumpsum injections P t τ t , which households receive in the asset market, serve as a central bank instrument. As will be demonstrated below, money supply can equivalently be specified by assuming that money is injected via open market operations, instead of via lump-sum transfers. We further assume that households have to fulfill a no-Ponzi game condition,
We assume that households monopolistically supply differentiated labor services l j , which are transformed into aggregate labor input l t where l
The elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services η t > 1 is allowed to vary exogenously over time. Cost minimization then leads to the following labor demand
dj, where w t denotes aggregate real wage rate.
Maximizing the objective (1), subject to the budget constraint (2), the labor demand condition, and the no-Ponzi-game condition, for given initial values Z j0 and M j,−1 leads to the following first order conditions:
where π denotes the inflation rate (π t = P t /P t−1 ), λ the shadow price of wealth and ξ the wage mark-up where ξ t = η t /(η t − 1). The stochastic properties of ξ t will be discussed below. Furthermore, the budget constraint (2) holds with equality and the transversality condition, lim s→∞ β t+s E t [λ jt+s (M jt+s + Z jt+1+s )/P t+s ] = 0, must be satisfied. The oneperiod nominal interest rate on a risk-free portfolio, which serves as an alternative central bank instrument, is defined as follows
Using (4) money demand can be written as ν m (M jt /P t ) = u c (c jt ) (R t − 1) /R t . The final consumption good is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. The CES aggregator of differentiated goods is defined as y
it di, with > 1, where y t is the number of units of the final good, y it the amount produced by firm i, and the constant elasticity of substitution between these differentiated goods. Let P it and P t denote the price of good i set by 11 ECB Working Paper Series No. 533
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A firm i produces good y i employing a technology which is linear in labor: y it = l it , where l t = R 1 0 l it di. Hence, labor demand satisfies: mc it = w t , where mc it = mc t denotes real marginal costs.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as developed by Calvo (1983) . Each period firms may reset their prices with the probability 1 − φ independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of firms is assumed to adopt the previous period's prices according P it = P it−1 . In each period a measure 1−φ of randomly selected firms sets new prices e P it in order to maximize the expected sum of discounted future dividends (D it = (P it − P t mc t ) y it ): max P it E t P ∞ s=0 φ s q t,t+s ( e P it y it+s − P t+s mc t+s y it+s ), s.t. y it+s = e P it − P t+s y t+s . The first order condition is given by
Aggregate output is y t = (P * t /P t ) l t , where
The central bank is assumed to trade with households in the asset markets. There, it injects money via lump sum transfers P t τ t . Its budget constraint is given by P t τ t = M t −M t−1 = (µ t − 1) M t−1 , where µ t denotes the gross money growth rate,
It should be noted that we can, alternatively, assume that money and government bonds B are exclusively traded in open market operations, where their supply is characterized by "holding fiscal policy constant in the face of a government asset exchange" (see, e.g., Sargent and Smith, 1987) :
t−1 B t−1 and P t τ t = 0. 10 A consistent initial value for total government liabilities would be equal to zero, B −1 + M −1 = 0, which is consistent with government solvency, lim s→∞ (B t+s + M t+s )Π s v=1 (1/R b t+v ) = 0. This alternative specification is then equivalent to the former specification. Finally, the central bank is assumed to set either the risk-free nominal interest rate R t or the money growth rate µ t = m t π t /m t−1 , where m denotes real balances m t = M t /P t . The equilibrium for R t > 1 is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium for R t > 1 is a set of sequences {y t , l t ,
satisfying the firms' first order conditions mc t = w t , (5) with e P it = e P t , and P
, and the transversality condition, given a monetary policy, a sequence {ε t } ∞ t=0 , and initial values P −1 > 0, P * −1 > 0, and m −1 P −1 = M −1 > 0.
10 The households' budget constraint would then be given by
, and the first order condition on bond holdings by u c (c jt ) = βR
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The stochastic process for the wage mark-up ξ t is assumed to satisfy b ξ t = ρ b ξ t−1 +ε t , where b ξ t = log ξ t − ξ and ρ ∈ [0, 1). The innovations are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and a constant variance, ε t ∼ N (0, var e ).
Equilibrium behavior under different reaction functions
In this section we present the log-linearized version of the model described in the previous section and summarize the main equilibrium properties of the model under different reaction functions for the monetary instrument. The equilibrium conditions given in definition 1 are log-linearized at the deterministic steady state. 11 Given that our analysis focusses on the stabilization properties of monetary policy, we abstract from long-run effects of different monetary policy regimes and assume that they are consistent with the same steady state. We further assume that the steady state is characterized by a constant price level, such that the steady state values for the inflation rate, the money growth rate, and the interest rate are given by π = µ = 1 and R = 1/β > 1. A steady state is then characterized by uniquely determined values for output u c (y)/v l (y) = Ω, where Ω = ξ −1 > 1, and for real balances ν m (m) = u c (y) (1 − β). Throughout the paper, b
x t denotes the percent deviation of a generic variable x t from its steady state value x : b x = log(x t ) − log(x). An equilibrium of the log-linear model is defined as follows:
A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the model at the steady state is a set of sequences {b
where
, and χ = (1 − φ)(1 − βφ)/φ, the transversality condition, for a monetary policy, a se-
, and given initial values for nominal balances M −1 and the price level
In what follows, we consider three types of monetary policy regimes which are characterized by state contingent adjustments of the prevailing central bank instrument. The first monetary policy regime is characterized by a forward-looking reaction function for ECB Working Paper Series No. 533
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The reaction function (9) allows for an explicit feedback from the exogenous state (the cost-push shock). This is the main difference to widely applied interest rate feedback rules, which are specified without a feedback from private sector shocks ρ ξ = 0.
For the second regime we consider a history dependent reaction function for the riskfree nominal interest rate, which allows to smooth interest rates
where ρ s π /(1 − ρ R ) and ρ s y /(1 − ρ R ) measure the long-run feedback from inflation and output. In contrast to (9), the inertial reaction function (10) features a feedback from past conditions, b R t−1 . By adjusting the current interest rate contingent to a changes in a lagged variable, central bank behavior becomes history dependent under (10).
Under the third regime, the central bank applies a reaction function for the money growth rate:
Since The following lemma summarizes main properties of the fundamental solutions for the equilibrium sequences for the endogenous variables
for monetary policy satisfying (9), (10), or (11). It should be noted that the fundamental solution, i.e., the minimum state variable solution, is identical with the uniquely determined and stable solution in our framework. 13 The derivation of the conditions in part 1. and 2. of the lemma can be found in Woodford (2003a) . The proof of the third part relates to the analysis in Schabert (2005) and is provided in appendix 7.1.
Lemma 1 Consider the fundamental solution for the equilibrium sequences {x t } ∞ t=0 satisfying (6)- (8) and either (9), (10), or (11).
1. Under an interest rate policy (9) it takes the form b
, and is the unique stable equilibrium solution if and only if
2. Under an inertial interest rate policy (10) it takes the form b 
3. Under a money growth policy (11) it takes the form b
, and is the unique stable equilibrium solution if and only if a.)
The properties summarized in the first two parts of lemma 1 are well established (see Woodford, 2001 Woodford, , 2003a and are, therefore, not discussed in further detail. Subsequently, we will refer to the notion of an active (passive) interest rate policy, which is defined as an interest rate setting satisfying
According to lemma 1 part 3, the central bank is able to ensure the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium if the response of money supply to a rise in output or inflation is sufficiently small, in the sense that the conditions a.) and b.) are satisfied. If, however, money supply satisfies µ π + [(1 − β)/ω]µ y > 1, then any rise in inflation (or output) causes the central bank to raise the stock of nominal balances, which tends to increase the price level. Given that prices are not fully flexible, a rise in nominal balances is accompanied by a rise in real balances, which tends to lower the nominal interest rate by (8) and to raise aggregate demand by (6). Hence, monetary policy stimulates real activity and further increases inflation, such that self-fulfilling expectations or explosive equilibrium sequences are possible. The likelihood for explosiveness thereby increases with the price rigidity, i.e., with the fraction of firms that do not set prices in an optimal way.
It should be noted that condition a.) ensures the existence of exactly one stable eigenvalue, which lies between zero and one, and therefore the existence and the uniqueness of stable and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences. Condition b.) further guarantees that there is no additional negative and stable eigenvalue, which would allow for an alternative stable solution characterized by equilibrium sequences that oscillate around the steady state.
Monetary policy under discretion
In this section we characterize the central bank's plan under discretionary optimization and discuss the existence of multiple solutions to the plan. In the second part, we establish the existence of reactions functions of the type (9), (10), or (11) that implement the central bank's plan and examine their ability to solve the indeterminacy problem. Throughout the subsequent analysis, we repeatedly apply some standard parameter values for σ, ϑ, β, φ, and for demonstrative purposes. They are given in table 1. We set (the inverse of) the intertemporal substitution elasticities equal to two, σ = ϑ = σ m = 2, implying the income elasticity of money demand to equal one (see 8). We further set β = 0.99, = 6, and φ = 0.8; the latter being consistent with empirical evidence, for example by Gali and Gertler (1999) . 14 As an alternative, we consider a lower value for the fraction 14 Given these parameter values, the composite coefficients in (7) equal χ = 0.052, and ω = 0.208.
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October 2005 of non-optimizing price setters (φ = 0.5), which might be more consistent with recent microeconomic evidence (see Bils and Klenow, 2004) . Finally, for the steady state velocity ν = y/m we use the value 2 for the benchmark case and, alternatively, the value 0.44, which is taken from Christiano et al. (2005) . 
Discretionary policy and equilibrium multiplicity
We now examine the plan of a central bank that aims to maximize social welfare. We realistically assume that the central bank does not have access to a technology which enables a commitment to a once-and-for-all policy. Thus, we assume that it aims to maximize social welfare in a discretionary way. We follow Woodford (2003a) and apply a linear-quadratic approximation of household welfare at the undistorted steady state. Since we want to abstract from long-run distortions due to monopolistic competition we assume that an unspecified (lump-sum tax financed) wage subsidy ensures Ω = 1. We further assume that the long-run distortion due to transactions frictions is negligible. 15 Applying a second-order Taylor-expansion of household welfare and of the private sector equilibrium conditions at the undistorted steady state, leads to the following objective, as shown by Woodford (2003a, proposition 6.8) 16
where α = ω , and ϕ = 1
and Υ > 0. Applying the parameter values in table 1, the weights in the loss function are α = 0.0347 and ϕ = 0.215. The loss function weight ϕ on the interest rate variance, which provides a measure for the severity of the distortion induced by transactions frictions, is thus 6.2-times larger than the weight on output fluctuations for our benchmark parametrization. 17 The relative size of the weight ϕ, which will be crucial for the subsequent analysis, is similar to Woodford's (2003b) value (4.9) and much smaller than Walsh's (2005) value (25.7). Evidently, the weight on the inflation variance is still larger than the other weights, indicating that the predominant distortion is induced by the price rigidity.
In the subsequent section we will apply alternative values for the velocity ν and for the interest elasticity of money (induced by changes in σ m ), which alter the welfare costs of interest rate changes, and we change the fraction of non-optimizing firms φ. The central bank's problem under discretion can be summarized by a simple linearquadratic set-up, where (12) serve as the policy objective and the linear equilibrium conditions (6)- (8) as constraints. Taking expectations as given, leads to the following first order conditions for all periods t ≥ 0 :
where φ 1t and φ 2t denote the multiplier on the constraints (6) and (7), respectively. We can then define a central bank's plan as follows.
(6)- (8), and the transversality condition, given { b ξ t } ∞ t=0 and an initial value b m −1 .
According to the first part of lemma 1, a monetary policy satisfying (9) is associated with a unique equilibrium solution if and only if ρ π + 1−β ω ρ y > 1. The central bank's first order condition (13), which is often called "targeting rule" (see Svensson, 1999) , implies the relation between the interest rate, inflation, and output to satisfy ρ π = ω σϕ and ρ y = α σϕ (as well as ρ ξ = 0). The central bank's plan therefore exhibits a unique solution only if the weight ϕ is sufficiently small. Otherwise, discretionary policy is associated with equilibrium multiplicity, which has also been shown by Brueckner and Schabert (2005) and Kurozumi (2005) for an isomorphic model and by Albanesi et al. (2003) , King and Wolman (2004) , and Siu (2005) for models with different price setting schemes. The condition for the existence of multiple equilibria is summarized in the following lemma. . This solution takes the form b x t = x( b ξ t ). If ϕ > ϕ * , there further exist stable autoregressive solutions to the plan.
According to lemma 2, the central bank's plan under discretion is associated with a unique solution if the distortion induced by transactions frictions are sufficiently small such that ϕ < ϕ * . 18 Applying the parameter values in table 1, leads to a threshold equal to ϕ * = 0.105. Hence, our benchmark value for the interest rate weight (ϕ = 0.215) clearly exceeds this threshold, indicating that there exists multiple solutions to the plan. When transactions frictions are non-negligible, the central bank is not willing to strongly stabilize inflation and the output gap, since the associated interest rate adjustments lead to welfare ECB Working Paper Series No. 533
October 2005 losses. If ϕ > ϕ * , interest rates are adjusted in a passive way, ρ π + 1−β ω ρ y < 1, which allows for multiple equilibria (see lemma 1). 19 Then, there exists a stable solution without any endogenous state variable, b
x t = x( b ξ t ), as well as stable autoregressive equilibrium solutions that feature a lagged endogenous state variable, b
Further, there exist non-fundamental solutions, featuring an extraneous state variable, that allow for expectations to become self-fulfilling, i.e., for sunspot equilibria. In the subsequent analysis we will not apply the latter type of solutions.
Implementing the plan under discretionary optimization
In this section we take a closer look at the implementation of the central bank's plan given in definition 2. We examine if and how a central bank can implement its plan with reaction functions of the form (9), (10), and (11). In particular, we want to assess if the plan can be implemented in a stable and unique way, such that explosive equilibrium sequences and endogenous fluctuations are avoided. Evidently, a forward-looking interest rate reaction function (9) can uniquely implement the plan if ϕ < ϕ * , since the central bank's first order condition (13) can be interpreted as a specific case with ρ ξ = 0. If ϕ > ϕ * , the central bank can design forward-looking reaction functions with ρ ξ 6 = 0 which uniquely implement its plan. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the central bank controls the interest rate in a forwardlooking way. Then, there exist infinitely many reaction functions (9) which uniquely implement the central bank's plan. They are characterized by ρ ξ 6 = 0.
Proof. The fundamental equilibrium solution under (9) is characterized by b π t = η 1 b ξ t and b y t = η 2 b ξ t , and therefore b π t = η 1 η 2 b y t . Lemma 1 part 1 then implies that for any ζ π and
Hence, regardless whether its plan exhibits a unique solution (ϕ < ϕ * ) or multiple solutions (ϕ > ϕ * ), the central bank can always uniquely implement the fundamental solution by choosing a particular forward-looking reaction function of the type (9). To be more precise, it can design a forward-looking reaction function, which is characterized by a feedback from inflation and output which is strong enough to rule out multiple solutions (by satisfying ρ π + [(1 − β)/ω]ρ y > 1). At the same time, an appropriate feedback from the exogenous state variable ensures that the implemented equilibrium is consistent with the fundamental solution to the plan. When the central bank applies an inertial interest rate reaction function (10) this picture changes. If transactions frictions are very small such that ϕ < ϕ * , there is a unique stable solution to the central bank's plan of the form b x t = x( b ξ t ). According to lemma 1 part 2, the central bank can therefore not apply an inertial interest rate reaction function to implement its plan (in a stable way). If transactions frictions are sufficiently large, ϕ > ϕ * , the central bank can in principle implement a stable set of sequences of the form b x t = x( b R t−1 , b ξ t ) which are consistent with its plan. A closer look at the feedback coefficients of the inertial interest rate reaction function however shows that such an equilibrium is not uniquely determined.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank controls the interest rate according to an inertial reaction function (10). If ϕ < ϕ * , it cannot implement its plan in a stable way. If ϕ > ϕ * , it cannot implement its plan in a unique way.
Proof. Consider an inertial reaction function b
, which implements a set of equilibrium sequences {b x * t } ∞ t=0 consistent with the plan under discretionary optimization. According to lemma 1 part 2, the fundamental equilibrium solution then takes the form b
According to lemma 2, the sequences {b x * t } ∞ t=0 are unstable if ϕ < ϕ * and stable if ϕ > ϕ * (see also appendix 7.4). Now suppose that ϕ > ϕ * (A1) and that ρ * π + [(1 − β)/ω]ρ * y > 1 − ρ * R (A2) are satisfied. Then, the set of sequences {b x * t } ∞ t=0 would be uniquely determined and stable, and the interest rate solution would read b R t = δ R b R t−1 + δ Re b ξ t with δ R ∈ (0, 1). Combining the latter with the reaction function would lead to the equilibrium relation b
immediately that for any given ρ * R 6 = δ R there exist exactly one set of coefficients {ρ * π , ρ * y , ρ * ξ } that is consistent with the central bank's first order condition (13). These coefficients have to satisfy ρ * π /(1 − ρ * R /δ R ) = ω/(σϕ) > 0, ρ * y /(1 − ρ * R /δ R ) = α/(σϕ) > 0, and ρ * ξ = ρ * R δ Re /δ R . If ρ * R > δ R , the coefficients ρ * π and ρ * y have to be negative, which contradicts assumption (A2). If ρ * R < δ R , assumption (A2) implies that the coefficients satisfy
This contradicts assumption (A1), which implies ω σϕ + 1−β ω α σϕ < 1. Hence, if ϕ > ϕ * the central bank's plan cannot uniquely be implemented. ¥ Proposition 2 thus indicates that the central bank's plan cannot be implemented by an inertial interest rate reaction function in a stable and unique way. If transactions frictions are sufficiently large such that ϕ > ϕ * , the central bank's first order condition (13) requires passive (short-run) interest rate adjustments. In order to implement equilibrium sequences that are consistent with this behavior, an inertial reaction function (10) has to exhibit feedback coefficients that imply interest rates to be passively adjusted in the long-run, state variables (see lemma 1 part 2). Thus, when the central bank applies an inertial interest rate reaction function to implement its plan in a history dependent way, it does not rule out equilibrium multiplicity and therefore allows for endogenous fluctuations. Now consider the case where the central bank uses money injections as its instrument and controls the money growth rate in a state contingent way (11). The minimum state variable solution for a rational expectations equilibrium then takes the form b
(see lemma 1 part 1). We want to assess whether there exists a money growth reaction function of the form (11) that can implement the central bank's plan. 20 Lemma 3 Suppose that the central bank uses money injections as its instrument. Then, there exists a money growth reaction function (11) that implements equilibrium sequences that are consistent with the plan. It satisfies
Proof. See appendix 7.2.
According to lemma 3, the central bank's plan can in principle be implemented by a money growth reaction functions (11) . It remains to analyze whether a money growth reaction function can implement the plan in a stable and unique way. The following proposition refers to the particular reaction function characterized in lemma 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the central bank implements its plan with a money growth reaction function satisfying (11) and (14). If ϕ > ϕ * , the equilibrium sequences are stable, non-oscillatory, and uniquely determined. If ϕ < ϕ * , they are unstable.
Proof. See appendix 7.3.
A money growth reaction function of the type (11) can thus implement the central bank's plan in a stable, non-oscillatory, and unique way, if transactions frictions are sufficiently large (ϕ > ϕ * ). Otherwise (ϕ < ϕ * ), a money growth reaction function cannot implement the plan in a stable way, which corresponds to the case of inertial interest rate adjustments (see proposition 2). In contrast to the latter case, a central bank can avoid equilibrium multiplicity by applying the money growth rate as its instrument. Thus, a money growth policy ensures a unique determination of the plan while a corresponding (passive) interest rate policy allows for multiple equilibria in our sticky price model. This results corresponds to its well-known property of money growth policy to facilitate nominal determinacy when prices are perfectly flexible (see Sargent and Wallace, 1975) . While the predetermined value of beginning-of-period real balances serve as equilibrium selection criterion under a money growth reaction function (11), the mere introduction of the lagged interest rate as a policy indicator is not sufficient for this purpose.
Monetary instruments and social welfare
In this section we examine social welfare when the central bank applies different instruments in order to implement its plan under discretionary optimization. To compare the welfare implications of different monetary policy regimes, we focus on the case ϕ > ϕ * (see lemma 2). We restrict our attention to stable fundamental (minimum state variable) solutions which are characterized in lemma 1. To be more precise, in the case where the central bank sets the interest rate in a forward-looking way (9) or controls the money growth rate according to (11), we assume that it applies a particular reaction function for the prevailing instrument that ensures its plan to be implemented in a unique and stable way. 21 As shown in proposition 2, this is not possible for the case where the central bank applies an inertial interest rate reaction function (10). The fundamental solution under an inertial interest rate policy reads b
see part 1 of lemma 1). If the central bank applies an
inertial interest rate reaction function or a money growth reaction function, the equilibrium sequences become history dependent. Under an inertial interest rate reaction function, the solution takes the form b
(see lemma 1 part 2). Under a money growth reaction function it takes the form b
1 part 3). The solution coefficients are derived in appendix 7.4. Before we turn to the welfare comparison, which will be based on the unconditional variances of the endogenous variables, we briefly want to assess the difference between the conditional variances of a forward-looking solution and of a history dependent solution to the central bank's plan. In particular, we compare the conditional variance of inflation which is implemented by a forward-looking interest rate reaction function,
to its counterpart under a money growth reaction function,
Since, the solution coefficients (given in appendix 7.4) are in general too complex to compare these variances, we apply the simplifying parameter values σ = 1 , σ m = 1, ϑ = 0, and v = 1. We then obtain tractable expressions for the limiting case where the discount factor converges to one β → 1. 22 The ratio of the variances 21 The existence of such reaction functions have been established in proposition 1 for an interest rate regime and in proposition 3 for a money growth regime for ϕ > ϕ * . 22 For the limiting case β → 1, the variances are given by lim β→1 var
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Suppose that the autocorrelation of cost-push shocks is sufficiently large such that ρ/ (1 − ρ) 2 > 1/ω. Then, ∆ > 0 and the term in the square brackets in (15) is smaller than one, given that the solution under the money growth reaction function is stable and non-oscillatory δ 1 ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for any given value b m t−1 , the inflation variance under a money growth policy can be smaller than under a forwardlooking interest rate policy,
< 1, if the variance of the cost-push shock var( b ξ t ) is sufficiently large. If, however, the autocorrelation is small ρ/ (1 − ρ)
2 < 1/ω, the inflation variance for a history dependent solution is always larger then for a purely forward-looking solution. Under a history dependent solution, the responses to a shock can be spread out over time and might not die out after the shock disappears. This effect tends to raise the variance, in particular, when shocks are not very persistent. If the autocorrelation of the common exogenous state is large, the macroeconomic responses to shocks can persist even if there is no endogenous state variable. If the variance of the exogenous state var( b ξ t ) is further large enough, then a history dependent solution can be associated with a smaller variance, as shock responses are smoothed. This principle also applies for the unconditional variances, which will be demonstrated in the subsequent welfare analysis.
For the welfare analysis we apply the second order approximation to household welfare (12). Since policy implementation is -by assumption -ensured to be steady state invariant, we use the welfare measure
and var(b x t ) denotes the variance of a generic variable b x t . Let var x denote its unconditional variance, i.e., the variance conditional upon the state in period t = 0. We assume that the state in the initial period is identical with the steady state, such that
Since the discount factor is held constant throughout our analysis, L provides a measure for the welfare ranking of allocations implemented by different policy regimes. Given the solution coefficients under the reaction functions (9)-(11), which are derived in appendix 7.4, we compute values for the variances. The unconditional variances for the fundamental solution under a forward-looking interest rate reaction function are var π = η 2 1 var ξ , var y = η 2 2 var ξ , and var R = η 2 3 var ξ , where var ξ = (1 − ρ 2 ) −1 var e denotes the variance of the cost-push shock. with ρ in a non-monotonic way. For high values (ρ > 0.8) the relative loss decreases with ρ since the variance of the cost-push shock var ξ rises more strongly with higher values for ρ than the unconditional variances of endogenous variables. For ρ < 0.8, this effect is reversed. In contrast, under the history dependent solutions implemented by an inertial interest rate policy or a money growth policy, the relative loss monotonically decreases with ρ. These solutions exhibit a backward-looking element that is independent of the shock persistence, namely, an endogenous state variable with a non-zero eigenvalue (which equals 0.83 for the benchmark parameter values). As a consequence, the variances of endogenous variables are much less affected by ρ than var ξ . It should be noted that 23 ECB Working Paper Series No. 533
October 2005 empirical evidence suggest the autocorrelation ρ to be high. For example, Ireland's (2004) estimation of a similar model leads leads to ρ = 0.95. Overall, the welfare losses of both history dependent solutions are closely related, though the loss under ii.) is almost always slightly smaller than under iii.). For ρ = 0.95, the relative loss (0.016) for a purely forward-looking solution induced by a forwardlooking interest rate policy, is clearly larger than those under an inertial interest rate policy (0.0020) and a money growth policy (0.0019). As demonstrated for the conditional inflation variances (see 15), forecast error variances can be reduced by the inclusion of a relevant lagged endogenous variable in the information set. Yet, unconditional variances can increase with the eigenvalues of endogenous variables, which enlarge the support of their distributions. Depending on whether the former or the latter effect dominates, a history dependent solution can, therefore, lead to higher or lower welfare losses. The latter effect becomes less relevant if the common (exogenous) state already exhibits a high eigenvalue ρ. For our benchmark parameterization, ρ > 0.5 is sufficient for this. Then, social welfare is higher when the central bank implements its plan in a history dependent way, i.e., by ii.) or iii.). If the autocorrelation ρ is low (here ρ ≤ 0.5), the welfare-reducing impact of the endogenous state on the variance of macroeconomic variables prevails, such that social welfare is higher under a forward-looking interest rate policy. elasticity still equals one. As a consequence, the loss function weight on output fluctuations rises to α = 0.07, whereas the weight on interest rate fluctuations falls to ϕ = 0.107 (while ϕ * equals 0.104). Given that the distortion due to transactions frictions is less costly, a welfare gain from a history dependent implementation of the time consistent plan requires a higher value for ρ than before. A forward-looking interest rate policy then leads to lower welfare losses if ρ ≤ 0.8. We further examined the case where the steady state velocity ν is lowered to a value of 0.44, which is taken from Christiano et al. (2005) . This evidently emphasizes the role of money and therefore the welfare costs of interest rate changes measured by ϕ (see 12), while it leaves the private sector equilibrium conditions unaffected. The weight ϕ then almost equals the weight on the inflation variance ϕ = 0.98, while α equals 0.035. A a consequence, the threshold for ρ falls to 0.4 (see table A2 in appendix 7.5). 23 Table 4 Welfare losses L/var ξ under more flexible prices (φ = 0.5) To get an intuition for the role of transactions frictions, suppose that the autocorrelation ρ equals zero, such that E t b y t+1 = E t b π t+1 = 0 under an interest rate policy. Further consider a cost-push shock that tends to raise inflation. Then, a reduction in output (and inflation) requires a strong interest rate adjustment since the aggregate demand condition
Under a history dependent solution, a reduction in current output implies b
It should be noted that the relative losses under the history dependent solutions are then also not strictly decreasing in ρ, which is (partially) due to the lower eigenvalue 0.75. a stable and non-oscillatory equilibrium. As a consequence, smaller interest rate changes are required as long as monetary policy stabilizes expected inflation by applying small or negative values for µ π and for µ y . Thus, the change in expectation formation can reduce the interest rate variance and, according to the central bank's first order condition (13), also the variances of the other endogenous variables. As a consequence, welfare losses can be reduced under a history dependent solution, while the welfare gain increases with the interest elasticity of money demand and decreases with the velocity. Further, when prices are more flexible, future inflation is expected to return faster to its steady state value, which also tends to reduce the required increase in the nominal interest rate and, thus, welfare losses. When, for example, the fraction of non-optimizing price setters is set to a smaller value (φ = 0.5), which is more in accordance with microeconomic evidence (see Bils and Klenow, 2004) , there is a welfare gain of a history dependent implementation even for an autocorrelation of ρ = 0.4 (see table 4).
Conclusion
When money is held to reduce transactions costs, a central bank should abstain from strong adjustments of nominal interest rates. This might however be necessary for the stabilization of prices in an environment where price movements are associated with welfare costs. If the central bank acts in a discretionary way such a trade-off can lead to an optimal policy plan which fails to uniquely pin down an allocation and equilibrium price system. Or, put in terms of New Keynesian macroeconomics, the central bank's plan under discretionary optimization can imply interest rate adjustments that violate the Taylorprinciple. Once a policy plan is consistent with multiple equilibria, different central bank operating procedures can be associated with different macroeconomic outcomes.
In this paper we apply a standard New Keynesian model and compare social welfare of different equilibrium solutions to the central bank's plan under different means of monetary policy implementation. The central bank either sets the nominal interest rate in a forwardlooking way or in an inertial way, or it uses money injections. Since the central bank acts under discretion, it does not account for its impact on private sector expectations such that its plan does not exhibit any backward-looking element. However, monetary policy can be history dependent if the central bank implements its plan by inertial interest rate adjustments or by money injections. By providing a link to past conditions, monetary policy then alters the way private sector expectations are built and can thereby affect macroeconomic fluctuations. As responses to aggregate shocks are smoothed out, a history dependent monetary policy implementation can reduce welfare losses compared to an entirely forward-looking conduct of monetary policy. In particular, this welfare gain increases with the persistence of cost-push shocks, with the interest rate elasticity of money demand, and with the degree of price flexibility. However, the central bank can only avoid a history dependent equilibrium to exhibit real indeterminacy if it implements its plan by money injections. The predetermined stock of money then becomes a relevant state variable and serves as an equilibrium selection criterion. Correspondingly, the interest rate should be applied as the monetary policy instrument if transactions frictions are negligibly small compared to distortions induced by price rigidities.
The results in this paper can further be interpreted in an alternative way. Studies on optimal monetary policy usually apply stylized models where the issue of policy implementation is not explicitly considered. While some real world central banks might be able to change interest rate targets by mere announcements, the majority of central banks still implements operating targets by quantity adjustments in open market operations. A reduction of monetary policy to (forward-looking) interest rate adjustments can therefore overemphasize problems that originate in the lack of history dependence. These problems might in fact be less severe if one considers the underlying money supply behavior, which is, in general, not independent from past conditions, i.e., the accumulated stock of outstanding money.
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Proof of lemma 1
To establish the claim made in the third part of the lemma, we eliminate the interest rate with the money demand condition (8). The model under a money growth policy can then be summarized by (6), the reaction function (11), and Rσb y t = σE t b
π t+1 , where we used R = R for convenience. The model can further be written as
The characteristic polynomial of A is given by
Given that the model exhibits one predetermined, b m t−1 , and two jump variables, b π t and b c t , stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences require exactly one stable eigenvalue.
To derive the conditions therefore, we use that the value of Q(X) at X = 0 : Q(0) = −Rβ −1 < −1. Thus, det(A) = −Q(0) > 1 implying that there are either two or zero negative eigenvalues, and that there is at least one unstable eigenvalue. The existence of a stable root lying between zero and one, thus, requires Q(1) > 0. Examining Q(X) at X = 1, which is given by
reveals that the value Q(1) depends on the elasticities µ π and µ y :
While this ensures X 1 ∈ (0, 1) and thus the existence of a solution with stable and nonoscillatory equilibrium sequences, uniqueness additionally requires the remaining roots, X 2 and X 3 , to lie outside the unit circle. For this, we assess Q(X) at X = −1, which is given by
As det(A) > 1, two further stable roots (either complex or real) cannot exist, since they would necessarily lead to a determinant with an absolute value that is smaller than one. Thus for Q(−1) < 0, there exists exactly one stable eigenvalue. This is ensured by
Hence, the equilibrium sequences are stable and uniquely determined if and only if µ π + 1−β ω µ y < 1 and µ π + µ y
. Then, the single stable eigenvalue lies between zero and one X 1 ∈ (0, 1). ¥
Proof of lemma 3
To characterize the equilibrium behavior of nominal interest rates under a state contingent money growth policy b
b R t , which together with the money growth reaction function (11) leads to,
Now use that the fundamental solution under a money growth policy implies
Thus, the current nominal interest rate is characterized by the following equilibrium relation
we can rewrite this expression as
We further know that there exists a unique value for µ * ξ , such that the term in the curly brackets equals zero if µ ξ = µ * ξ , since all solution coefficients in the curly brackets are either independent of µ ξ , such as δ m , δ Rm , δ πm , and δ πm , or are linear in µ * ξ , such as δ me , δ Re , δ ye , and δ πe . The value of µ * ξ is given by
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which are satisfied by equilibrium sequences implemented by a money growth reaction function. Hence, a money growth reaction function satisfying (18),
implements a set of equilibrium sequences which are consistent with the plan. ¥
Proof of proposition 3
From lemma 1 and 2 it follows immediately that a history dependent solution under a money growth reaction function (11) has to be unstable if ϕ < ϕ * . It remains to examine the stability and uniqueness properties of this solution when ϕ > ϕ * . For this we consider the characteristic polynomial of the model (6)- (8) and (11), which has been derived in the proof of lemma (1), Xσm (see lemma 3), in order to implement the central bank's plan, and they are functions of the particular eigenvalue. Eliminating the reaction function parameter with these conditions, we end up with the following cubic equation for the eigenvalues X:
It can immediately be seen that
implying that the product of the eigenvalues exceeds one. Hence, there is at least one unstable eigenvalue and either no or two negative eigenvalues. Assessing the value of Q(X) at X = 1, Q(1) =
Thus, there exists one stable eigenvalue X 1 if and only if ϕ > α σ 1−β ω + ω σ . It satisfies X 1 ∈ (0, 1). We further use the second derivative of Q(X) at X = 1, which is strictly negative
If the roots X 2 and X 3 are real, this evidently ensures the existence of exactly one stable eigenvalue. When the roots X 2 and X 3 are complex, they can be written as X 2 , X 3 = h±vi. Using X 1 + X 2 + X 3 = b for the cubic polynomial Q(X) = X 3 + bX 2 + cX + d, we further know that h then satisfies h = (b − X 1 ) /2. Given that Q 00 (1) = 6 + 2b < 0 ⇔ b < −3, we know that h > 1 and that X 2 and X 3 are unstable, if ϕ > ϕ * ⇔ X 1 ∈ (0, 1). Hence, under a money growth reaction function (14) 
generic solution for the coefficients derived above, thus reduce to b π t = η 1 b ξ t , b y t = η 2 b ξ t , and b R t = η 3 b ξ t . These coefficients are given by η 1 = (α + σ 2 ϕ − σ 2 ρϕ)χz, η 2 = (σρϕ − ω)χz, and η 3 = (σω + αρ − σωρ) χz, where z = [α−αβρ−σωρϕ+ω 2 +σ 2 ϕ(1−ρ−βρ+βρ 2 )] −1 .
Inertial interest rate policy As for the previous regime, it is sufficient for our purpose to solve the equilibrium under an inertial interest rate reaction function (10) for the sequences of inflation, output, and the interest rate. In order to be consistent with the plan these sequences have to satisfy (6), (7), and (13). Eliminating output with the latter,
π t , leads to the following set of equilibrium conditions for inflation and the interest rate
The generic form of the minimum state variable solution for inflation and the interest rate under an inertial interest rate reaction function is given by
Applying these solutions, leads to the following set of conditions for the undetermined coefficients
0 = σωρ 4 − αρ 2 + αρρ 4 − σωρρ 4 + αρ 2 ρ 3 − σωρ 2 ρ 3 − σ 2 ϕρ 2 + σ 2 ρϕρ 2 + σ 2 ϕρ 1 ρ 2 , 0 = αχ − αρ 4 + αβρρ 4 + σωϕρ 2 + αβρ 2 ρ 3 − ω 2 ρ 4 .
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One solution is evidently given by ρ 1 = 0, which leads to the previous forward-looking solution. To assess the existence of another solution, let G(ρ 1 ) denote the quadratic polynomial in the square brackets. Since G(0) = β −1 + (α + ω 2 )/(ϕβσ 2 ) > 1 and G (1 The first two conditions can be combined to give δ 3 = ωδ 1 ψ 1 (1−ωψ 2 )−βδ 1 and the following condition, where δ 1 is the eigenvalue of real balances:
Evidently, there is one solution characterized by a zero eigenvalue δ 1 = 0. Let K(δ 1 ) denote the quadratic polynomial in the square brackets. As K(δ 1 ) is strictly positive at δ 1 = 0, K(0) = ϕ −1 β −1 σ −2 (α+ω 2 +σ 2 ϕ) > 1, and satisfies K(1) = ϕ −1 β −1 σ −2 (α−αβ−σωϕ+ω 2 ), we can conclude that there exists exactly one stable and non-zero root of K(δ 1 ), if and only if ϕ > ϕ * . Thus, when this condition is satisfied, the solution with δ 1 > 0 is stable and uniquely determined. Combining the remaining two equations, we end up with the following conditions for the coefficients δ 2 and δ 4 : δ 2 = − χ (ρ (σψ 2 + 1) − Rσψ 2 ) ψ 3 , δ 4 = χ + δ 2 βδ 3 + δ 2 ωψ 1 1 − βρ − ωψ 2 , where ψ 3 = " (σψ 1 (ρ + δ 1 − R) + σ m (R − 1) + δ 3 (σψ 2 + 1)) (1 − ωψ 2 − βρ) + (ρ (σψ 2 + 1) − Rσψ 2 ) (βδ 3 + ωψ 1 ) # .
In order to solve for output we apply b m t = δ 1 b m t−1 + δ 2 b ξ t and b π t = δ 3 b m t−1 + δ 4 b ξ t , leading to b y t = δ 5 b m t−1 + δ 6 b ξ t , where δ 5 = δ 3 ψ 2 + δ 1 ψ 1 , and δ 6 = δ 4 ψ 2 + δ 2 ψ 1 .
Finally, we solve for the interest rate using b R t = σ (R − 1) b y t − σ m (R − 1) b m t to give the solution for the nominal interest rate b R t = δ 7 b m t−1 + δ 8 b ξ t , where δ 7 = (R − 1) (σδ 5 − σ m δ 1 ) , and δ 8 = (R − 1) (σδ 6 − σ m δ 2 ) .
This completes the solution under a money growth reaction function (11) 
